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IntRodUCtIon
This article will analyse the Chinese contribution to the first cycle of the Human Rights Council's universal periodic review. In 2006, the then new U.N. Human Rights Council 2 was tasked with establishing the modalities of a universal periodic review of compliance by all U.N. member states with human rights and humanitarian law, irrespective of which treaties any state has elected to ratify. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and voluntary commitments of states can be used to discern the salient human rights standard, filling any gaps in a state's framework of human rights' obligations derived from their treaty ratifications. China was a vocal member of the Like Minded Group in the U.N. during this formative period and succeeded in securing a General Assembly, then Human Rights Council, resolution which reflected the group's view of universal periodic review.
An integral part of the review process is "peer review" of the performance of states by other states. China has been very active during this inter-governmental process, contributing to the majority of reviews. There is some literature and civil society reports on China's experience of universal periodic review, on universal periodic review generally, and on China's engagement with the U.N. and international human rights. However, there is no detailed qualitative analysis of the approach China took to its interventions in the interactive dialogue of other states. This article will fill that gap. Using the comments made on behalf of China in all peri- 1 Professor of International Human Rights, Northumbria University. This article was submitted and accepted for publication in 2012. , an attempt will be made to categorise the comments made by China. It will thus be possible to discern the nature of rights and issues China elected to focus on during its interventions. It will be interesting to see whether this matches areas identified by China in its voluntary human rights commitments, rights and freedoms expressed in treaties ratified, the millennium development goals and other documentation. Moreover it will be instructive to compare the areas identified by China for comment with those areas identified as areas of progress or concern by third states in China's own periodic review.
The article concludes with some observations on whether China's approach to the first cycle of universal periodic review embodies "form" (overt participation), over "substance," and thus whether or not China is making a meaningful contribution to the advancement of human rights through this mechanism.
UnIveRSal PeRIodIC RevIew
China is perhaps not regarded as the most fervent advocate of international human rights' standards, and the international (UN) monitoring systems. 4 Perhaps it is thus surprising that China has proven to be a very enthusiastic participant in the newest human rights monitoring system, universal periodic review. Indeed, as will be seen, China has proven to be one of the most active and most positive participants in the world. This development sits alongside the growth in stature of China on the international stage, joining the World Trade Organisation in 2001 and embracing human rights 3 All key documentation on universal periodic review is in the public domain, available at www.ohchr.org. Note that this article uses the English language version of all documents, where unavailable, the French language version was used as an alternative. as a concept, albeit perhaps with "Chinese characteristics."
5
During the formative stages of the Council (pre and post-establishment), China led the Like Minded Group 6 who were against singling out any states for criticism or comment within the new Council. 7 In such a way, it was proposed that the Council would establish itself as different from the Commission, which latterly was besmirched by allegations of bias and selective persecution or condoning of states on factors more attributable to that states' allies and power base rather than purely on the facts available. 8 During a meeting between the General Assembly President and the (now former) Commission of Human Rights, China's ambassador conveyed the views of the Like Minded Group, welcoming the decision of the General Assembly to create the Human Rights Council: "Human rights is not about 5 See, e.g., Information Office of the State Council of the People's of Republic of China, Human Rights in China (1991), available at http://www. china.org.cn/e-white/7/index.htm. Part X of this elaborates China's involvement in International Human Rights activities: "Consideration should be given to the differing views on human rights held by countries with different political, economic and social systems, as well as different historical, religious and cultural backgrounds. International human rights activities should be carried on in the spirit of seeking common ground while reserving differences, mutual respect, and the promotion of understanding and cooperation." 6 Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Viet Nam, and Zimbabwe. the preach and the preached, the condemn and the condemned." 9 That the Commission ceased to be a credible human rights body appeared agreed, opinions on how best to ameliorate the situation differed. Nevertheless, a major cultural shift from the perceived practice of the Commission 10 was supported by the Like Minded Group and, indeed, most of the United Nations' membership.
11
The Council was established and held its first session in June 2006, by which time the Economic and Social Council had disbanded its Commission on Human Rights. With a more transparent, geographically representative membership, China offered its candidature for election to membership of the inaugural Council.
12 It was duly elected, with its membership renewed for a further three years. 13 Note that it is no longer a member as the rules prevent any state from serving more than two consecutive terms.
14 Of course, China can present its candidature thereafter should, as seems highly probable, the government so desire. (The former Commission had no such restriction; thus some states sat on it for a decade or more, others almost permanently.) Many functions of the Commission were taken on (subject to a review and rationalisation process) by the Council. However, the Council also had some new functions, powers and responsibilities, reflecting in part the shift in emphasis from the Commission to the Council and the perceived needs of the international community almost sixty years As is apparent, the interactive dialogue "peer review" 29 aspect of the process is key to ensuring all states are treated the same and to rendering the review transparent.
30 Such a public forum also enables monitoring. The mechanism is "cooperative" rather than censorial and should fully involve the state under review with due consideration of "capacity-building needs" of the state. 31 This reflects the views of the Like Minded Group and, indeed, others: Neumayer notes that "for the most part, countries take relatively little interest in the extent of human rights violations in other countries." . . adopts the outcome of the universal periodic review on China which is constituted of the report of the Working Group on the review of China (A/HRC/11/25), together with the views of China concerning the recommendations and/or conclusions, as well as its voluntary commitments and its replies presented before the adoption of the outcome by the plenary to questions or issues that were not sufficiently addressed during the interactive dialogue in the Working Group (A/HRC/11/37, chap. VI)").
29
On "peer review" as opposed to "periodic review," see Gaer, supra note 16. Literature analyzing aspects of this new mechanism is emerging. Reviewing the first session, Redondo observes that many interventions were positive, congratulatory "pats-on-the-back" for states. 37 Meanwhile, Abebe considers the first two universal periodic review sessions, noting the power of regional alliances in issuing "shaming" criticisms and congratulatory comments during the interactive dialogue (his specific focus was African states though the phenomenon can be observed outwith that region), 38 whilst Ramcharan notes that the process has "one Achilles heel: many member states with atrocious human rights records are treated by their peers with kid gloves." 
34
The and the condemned" as quoted above although Alston considers that the very concept of universal periodic review responds to previous criticisms of both the Like Minded Group and western countries. 40 They argued that this would be counter-productive to the goal of encouraging states to improve the human rights situation. Certainly a less flexible, "pass/fail" style, approach is not likely to prove an incitement to states. The public nature of universal periodic review (as noted above all documentation is in the public arena and available free online in official languages) inevitably means states wish at least to be seen to comply with the process and with the applicable standards. The inherent vagueness of some human rights standards assists in this respect. However, care must be taken to ensure that the process is meaningful and promotes progress, rather than just a mere paper exercise.
Sweeney and Saito approach the first two sessions from an NGO perspective, raising a number of issues concerning state selectivity of topics raised during the reviews, and a general vagueness of future activity based on review outcomes to improve human rights on the ground. 41 This proved prescient and will be picked up later in this article. Naturally, the process is inter-governmental; thus it is not feasible to eradicate politicization when the membership of the Council remains states. Nevertheless, universal periodic review should include a wider range of participants than is the case in other inter-state mechanisms as other stakeholders, including NGOs, should be involved at the stage of drafting national state reports, contributing to the stakeholders report compiled by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and reviewing the working group's report during the Human Rights Council session and, of course, at the implementation of the review's accepted recommendations and voluntary commitments undertaken by the state within the territory of the State concerned.
42
In terms of the enabling resolution, the universal periodic review process is expected not to present an excessive burden to states, rather 40 SHA, supra note 9; Alston, supra note 7. it is promulgated as complementary to the existing treaty monitoring process, something "extra" and worthwhile. 43 Few states have ratified and submitted timely reports to all the core U.N. human rights treaty bodies; thus the Human Rights Council has a much wider remit than the treaty bodies. Moreover, as the universal periodic review process is based on the Charter of the U.N., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and voluntary pledges and commitment made by the state under review, as well as the treaties to which it is party, 44 the scope is considerably broader than that of the treaty bodies. Indeed, Gaer argues that universal periodic review could provide added value and complements the treaty bodies. 45 His analysis is based on the initial review sessions, thus no comment was possible on how the review outcomes would be used by treaty bodies and the effect they could have. In any event, it appears that little use is made of review outcomes before the treaty bodies although there is some evidence of states (including China) using selective treaty reports as a basis for questions and comments during interactive dialogues. 46 For the current paper, China will provide a vehicle for examining the review process and the non-confrontational stance espoused by the Like Minded Group it headed. Like every other U.N. member state, China can participate in the universal periodic review process in two ways: as a reviewee, in accordance with the prepared schedule; and as a reviewer. The focus of this article is on China as a reviewer, however, it is pertinent to first reflect on China's experience as a reviewee.
CHIna UndeR RevIew
China was itself reviewed during the fourth session of the first cycle of review. Its working group was notable as it attracted one of the largest number of intervening states of the entire first cycle. 47 Of the one hundred and fifteen states who sought to comment, sixty were permitted to participate in the interactive dialogue with some fifty-five "timed out" (as noted above there are strict time limits to ensure equality of treatment of all states 48 ) though offered the opportunity of contributing in writing through the intranet. In keeping with the then prevailing practice, China was reviewed whilst serving as a member of the Human Rights Council.
49 That China's working group dialogue attracted considerable interest is not surprising, the notable distinction between more critical comments by Western European and Others Group (WEOG) and East European EU member states and more positive supportive comments by almost every other state perhaps was. Several states expressed concern and regret at the politicization of human rights situation in China during the review process. 50 In the case of 47 Shortly thereafter, the modalities were adjusted and a maximum of sixty states was rarely permitted within the time frame of the "face-to-face" interactive dialogue. China, arguably the result of the review was, in places, "a thinly veiled and fairly coordinated challenge to certain practices -[especially] in China's case its retention and use of capital punishment," 51 the Western European and Others Group being particularly vocal in this regard. Of course, China retains the death penalty and has not ratified any human rights treaty which expressly prohibits its continued use (assuming compliance with minimum standards); thus technically it is not required in law to stop the practice. Perhaps this partially explains why China did not accept a number of the recommendations made during its review. McMahon and Ascherio classified all recommendations during the first six sessions of the review cycle with reference to the degree of action required of the state under review to fulfil any given recommendation. They then analysed the number of each classification of recommendation which was accepted by the states in the various U.N. regional groupings, highlighting some individual states. In the case of China, they note that China "accepted all forty-one of Asia and Africa's recommendations, thirty-eight of which fell into categories [requiring continuation of existing good practice, sharing of information and practice, general acceleration of practices] (by contrast, China only accepted eight of WEOG's [Western European and Others Group] sixty-nine recommendations, two-thirds of which were in categories [requiring the state to consider change or undertake specific action to effect change])."
52
As noted above, many of these WEOG recommendations related to the death penalty. The actual non-acceptance rate is thus arguably less than the statistics would suggest. Nevertheless, the death penalty was not the sole topic on which China received Western European and Others Group's recommendations. Perhaps the most noteworthy (for the present purpose) statistic is the acceptance rate of those recommendations praising Chinese practices and progress as, in the next section, the article will note that China itself generally contributes such positive, supportive recommendations to the reviews of other states. This suggests either such an approach has an effective impact on the Chinese government, or such comments are easily This statement reflects the views previously expressed by the Like Minded Group and which, as noted above, find expression in the enabling resolutions. Three years later, when presenting for re-election, China pledged to continue "to take an active part in the work of the Human Rights council and the Third Committee of the General Assembly, . . . encouraging the above-mentioned institutions to deal with human rights issues in a fair, objective and non-selective manner." 63 There is little scope to claim that China failed to deliver on its promised involvement in the Council. However, notwithstanding that fact, it is possible to question the impact of China's involvement -whether it contributed towards the improvement of the human rights situation in states.
China has proven to be a very active reviewer state, participating in the interactive dialogue of virtually every working group during the first cycle of the review process (and indeed, the initial review of the second cycle).
64
This article considers every intervention made by China during the first cycle of universal periodic review. To do this, the reports of each working group were examined, with China's comments isolated. The principal topics mentioned, even in passing, were identified and listed. A table of subjects of most interest to China thus emerged. The frequency with which China mentioned these most repeated topics is reflected in Figure 1 (Comments by China). Note that no judgment is made as to whether China was supportive or positive in respect of any single topic for this chart, simply the mention of the topic itself was sufficient. Moreover, each topic is only recorded once, even if China makes repeated mentions of it within any particular report. This provides the data for the following analysis.
a. topics addressed by China
In general, a disparate range of topics are covered in each review, occasionally a single topic proves especially popular -e.g. the death penalty 62 Aide Memoire, supra note 61, at 9.
63
Note verbale, supra note 13, at point 4.
64 China did not comment on very few States and was timed out of commenting on a further six (Singapore, Lebanon, Turkey, Italy, Qatar and Nicaragua), though, of course, for those States it could file comments, questions and recommendations on the intranet. during China's first review, as noted above. Ramcharan notes a "scattershot process" 65 to the selection of topics by member states. This is perhaps inevitable as the human rights situation is, of course, different in each states. A reviewing state is thus likely to identity different issues in different states. China certainly does this, although the data suggests the prevalence of certain topics.
As can be seen (figure one), development issues feature most prominently in the list of topics the Chinese delegation chose to focus on. In this category, fulfilment of the millennium development goals, economic development, social progress, poverty and employment are categorized together. Such issues were raised by China in over ninety periodic reviews. China's emphasis on poverty and development, health and education is perhaps unsurprising. There are two strands of explanation-firstly, that these are rights China considers crucially important and thus prioritises or secondly, these are rights which China itself fulfils to a greater rather than lesser degree.
On the former, China has long been a proponent of the preeminence of basic survival rights such as food, housing, healthcare and the development 65 Ramcharan, supra note 39, at 55.
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through education within a strong institutional structure. 66 These are also rights which appear in China's first National Human Rights Action Plan 2009-2010, 67 a two year plan published following, but intimated during, China's own periodic review. 68 Perhaps they are thus "soft" options upon which China can comment from a relative position of strength, whilst still accepting advice on good practice to further develop its own position. A number of states commented positively on China's progress on development and its fulfilment of the millennium development goals. 69 The use of universal periodic review as a tool for securing the advancement of economic, social and cultural rights has been questioned and examined by Duggan-Larkin. 70 She notes that there is a degree of selectivity evident in the initial years of the process, least developed states facing far more questions on economic, social and cultural rights than developed states. 71 This pattern certainly continued throughout the first cycle and appears to have continued in the initial session of the second cycle. China, however, did raise such issues irrespective of the development status of the country under review, 72 although poverty and "development" are un- 76 It will be interesting to discover whether technical assistance has been offered, with those more developed states using the UPR process to channel their resources. The evidence so far (from interim reports) is not especially positive, but the reality will only become apparent as the second cycles reports emerge -part of the focus of the second cycle is to consider "the implementation of the accepted recommendations and the development in the human rights situation in the state under review." 77 As states do not generally refute offers of technical assistance or recommendations that technical assistance be sought, this could prove informative as to whether assistance was forthcoming and had any benefit for human rights on the ground.
On the second strand (that China itself adequately fulfils the rights raised), China is a proponent of the right to development and related rights. Indeed China commenced its own interactive dialogue in its working group session by highlighting the fact it is the largest developing state in the world. 78 China has ratified relevant core treaties such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Moreover, in terms of the UNDP's Human Development Index, China has a notable positive trajectory over the last thirty years. 79 China also secured early achievement of Millennium Development Goals. China has a good record of achievement in respect of development, making substantial progress towards achieving and now surpassing the Millennium Development Goals, a key indicator of development.
80 Within the U.N., the Chinese government have long participated in the evolution (from conceptualisation to adoption) of the Declaration on the Rights to Development and regularly co-sponsored the former Commission on Human Rights' resolutions on the right to development. In the words of the State Council's 1991 White Paper, "China pays close attention to the issue of the right to development." Support for development has continued since the collapse of the Commission. Finally, China has education and health as focal points for its current governmental strategies, which, in human rights terms, find expression in the first (and indeed now also second) national plan of action for human rights. Overall, social progress including education and health are central tenets of government policy. Whilst it is undoubtedly easier to manoeuvre standards and espouse differing views of progress in respect of economic, social and cultural rights as opposed to instantly realizable and challengeable civil and political rights, China does comment on a number of issues concerning judicial reform in, for example, Poland 81 and Bahrain, 82 and the status and condition of prisons and detainees during reviews of various states including Zambia, 83 Cuba 84 and Malta. 85 It even comments on the internet, expression and the need to control pornographic material during the review of the Netherlands. 86 Of course, China itself prioritises judicial reform in its national action plans and other domestic initiatives and makes claims on progress in, inter alia, its national plan of action and its statement to the working group undertaking its own review. 87 Thus there is evidence that China elects to comment across the full range of human rights, 88 not simply economic and social rights. Admittedly, the most common issue raised which can come under civil and political rights is discrimination and the treatment of women and children -these issues of course appear not only in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China has not yet ratified, 89 but also in the Conventions on Elimination of Discrimination against Women and on the Rights of the Child which it has. The prohibition on discrimination is, of course, pervasive; thus it applies also to economic, social and cultural rights. As figure 1, series 1 shows, after development (discussed above) China commented most frequently on education, health and discrimination. China has made significant gains in education and health, not least as evidenced by China's success in meeting millennium development goals in those areas. Discrimination, as noted above, is pervasive. China has commented on discrimination in a number of fields, including gender, national minorities, and the urban/rural differentiation of enjoyment of rights. Women and children also featured prominently, in almost fifty reviews. Both topics were often raised at once, perhaps indicating China's view that similar issues beset each group. Obviously, China has ratified both the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and thus 
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In China's first commitments and pledges lodged when seeking membership of the inaugural Human Rights Council, China stated it was "in the process of amending its Criminal Civil and Administrative Procedure Laws and deepening judicial reform to create conditions for ratification at an early date." Aide Memoire, supra note 61, at IV. This disappeared from the pledges and commitments tendered in support of its re-election in 2009. Note verbale, supra note 13. The second national human rights action plan 2012-2015, published June 2012, notes only that China "has continued to carry out administrative and judicial reforms and prepare the ground for approval of the 'International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.'" National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012-2015) at part V, ¶ 1, supra note 67.
can mention women and children as key issues, reflecting ratifications of China and other states, as well as issues of concern for the U.N. generally.
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With respect to treaty obligations, China does not systematically refer to the treaty ratification status and reporting obligations of states. However, there is evidence of China referring to treaty ratifications during the working group dialogues. 91 In each of these instances, China is referring to treaties which the state has already signed or indicated a willingness to accept. Already, the High Commissioner on Human Rights has noted the positive effect of universal periodic review on treaty ratifications 92 -arguably China could thus have made more recommendations concerning treaty ratification thereby demonstrating a first step towards impact on human rights. On cooperation with the Council, other human rights bodies and the OHCHR, China did make several relevant comments. for several states, including Indonesia, 93 Czech Republic, 94 and Tunisia.
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Once again, however, it stopped short of clear criticism of shortcomings. China itself pledged to fulfil its treaty obligations, "submit timely reports on implementation, and conduct constructive dialogues with relevant treaty bodies" 96 thus (again) is not commenting on anything it does not already claim it does.
b. nature of Comments Made by China
What is particularly striking when reviewing all China's interventions is the positivity of China's contributions. Thus in very few situations does China request a state to undertake any positive action. 97 Rather, the Chinese government's active interventions tend to suggest a state share its experiences (thus highlighting good practice) or simply respond to requests for further information. Indeed, when all comments made by all states are rated positive or negative, to the same criteria, China is the most positive Asian participant and, indeed, one of the most positive of all states participating in the review process. 98 This arguably demonstrates China's understanding that the process should be constructive and non- 
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Note verbale, supra note 13, annexe at point 4.
97
In initial working group reports, the full comment including recommendations of the intervening state was noted in one paragraph, the recommendations being extracted at the end. In later reviews, the comments appear in order but the recommendations are extracted and only appear at the end of the report, with the State making the recommendation noted. It is thus possible to ascertain whether any State is deemed to have made recommendations, irrespective of the year of the review. confrontational 99 and should ensure fulfilment of the objective of review specified by the Human Rights Council, 100 including the sharing of best practices. This China frequently does. Given the disparate human rights situations around the world, it is appropriate to question China's approach: will positive rhetoric really achieve the first objective of the review, viz. " [t] he improvement of the human rights situation on the ground," 101 or indeed, other objectives such as "fulfillment of the State's human rights obligations"?
102 If no positive recommendations are made to seek international aid and technical assistance, even those comments of China related to that may not achieve their goal.
Some political commentators characterise China's attitude towards human rights (and other international issues) as "soft power"
103 -a relatively subtle diplomatic exercise, little by little extending influence and reach through non-confrontational means, demonstrating by doing, rather than pontificating. By focussing on positives and on development issues, China is well-placed to succeed with such an approach, choosing topics in which it arguably can claim to lead by example. In human rights terms, this reflects a pragmatic approach -the process is engaged with without delivering (and conversely, inviting) criticism. In any case, it is well-established that states are, traditionally, unwilling to comment on the human rights situation in another state unless either their nationals are involved 104 or the situation is such that it could either spill over into their territory (should the state be a neighbour) or threaten international peace and security.
evalUatIon oF CHIna'S ContRIbUtIon
To determine the contribution made by China to the review process, it is useful to first revisit the objectives of the first cycle of review. These were 99 As noted above, see Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, supra note 18, annexe ¶ 3(g), and the view of the Like Minded Group.
100 Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, supra note 18, annex ¶ 4.
101 Id. at ¶ 4(a).
102 Id. at ¶ 4(b). 106 First and foremost, universal periodic review should have a demonstrable effect on human rights in every state, as noted above, it should not be simply a paper exercise. There are, of course, many different options for analysing the interventions made by China within the first cycle of universal periodic review. For the purpose of this article, the extent to which China is advancing the objectives of the review process is deemed central. This will be considered in the closing paragraphs. As a precursor, it is useful to first consider whether China's interventions are rooted in reciprocity and then the extent to which the comments reflect the tenor of the foundation U.N. documentation which tabulates the purpose of the review (General Assembly resolution 60/251 and Human Rights Council resolution 5/1).
a. Is Reciprocity a Factor?
China cannot be responding on the basis of reciprocity of comments. As noted above, China was not reviewed in the first session of the first cycle of reviews and thus commented on countries which did and did not comment on it. Furthermore, China participated in reviews of almost every state whilst (only) 115 states sought to comment on it. Obviously, maintaining such a level of involvement with the entire process allows China to monitor the mechanism by direct observation and participation. Given China's initial concerns over the process evolving into one of condemnation, rather than support, this is a sensible strategy. Moreover the topics raised by China do not necessarily reflect the topics raised by other states with respect to China (see figure 1, Comments on China). During China's own review, development issues (usually praise for China) then institutional issues (primarily ratification of treaties and institutional reforms of national bodies) were raised repeatedly. Although not shown on the comparative figure, the next most popular topic raised in comments on China was civil and political rights drawn primarily from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which China is not a party. Religious freedom, freedom of expression and freedom of association were frequently raised and inevitably China was criticized (as noted above, primarily by members of the WEOG group) for failing to reach the required standards. Although China has not ratified the International Covenant, it does accept, indeed its representatives helped to draft, 107 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which also proclaims expression and religion as basic freedoms. Moreover, the White Paper and the subsequent papers and national plans of action also contain detailed provision on this. 108 As figure 1 shows, after development (discussed above) China commented most frequently on education, health and discrimination. These were also popular topics to raise in respect of China's review. Education and health are two issues in which China has demonstrated considerable success (again, discussed above). Discrimination is pervasive across many/ all rights and freedoms. For the purpose of figure 1, the main issues commented on involved gender-based discrimination, national minorities and discrimination of rural dwellers as opposed to urban dwellers. The latter is an acknowledged issue in China which the government claims to be addressing. 109 China also regularly commented on issues concerning women and children, making interventions on each (and usually both) in some fifty state reviews. Although similar issues were raised in respect of China, the numbers of comments are far less than those on institutional issues, minorities (status of rather than discrimination) and the judicial system. Even on a state by state review, there is little evidence that China raises topics which were raised in respect of it specifically by any state.
b. are the Un guidelines Followed?
nation of Discrimination Against Women and the two international covenants (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). Accordingly, under the relevant resolution, these issues fall within not only the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but also the human rights instruments to which a state is party. 110 Moreover, addressing these rights and freedoms meets the objectives of improving human rights in the country under review, progressing the fulfilment of the state's human rights obligations and enhancing the state's capacity.
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China certainly made frequent reference to the need for international technical aid and assistance to help countries combat poverty and develop. 112 The principal argument against such an approach is that China elected to make very few concrete recommendations to states under review, not even regularly recommending that technical assistance be sought. This can be problematic although it is acknowledged that there is a narrow line between support and interference. China has long maintained that the international community has little right to interfere in matters deemed within national sovereignty. It is thus not especially surprising that it takes a non-interventionist approach to the human rights situation within other states. 113 However, does that really help the universal periodic review process improve the human rights situation on the ground? It is submitted that it does not. China's approach tends to the highlighting of good practice with little mention, particularly when dealing with less developed states, of action conducive to the improvement of the prevailing human rights situation. However, as noted above, 114 China did not accept many recommendations for concrete change within its own territory during its review. It would thus be hypocritical for the Chinese government to take a more proactive, interventionist stance towards other states. In spite of the foregoing, China did make several references to national human rights institutions. These are, of course, considered to be beneficial in promoting the protection of international human rights within states, 115 although China does not have one. It is thus perhaps striking that the state chose to comment on national institutions in several working group dialogues. 116 The prevailing U.N. view is undoubtedly that national human rights institutions should be encouraged. Indeed, considerable efforts are ongoing in Asia and the Pacific, for example, supporting the establishment of such bodies in states in the region.
China clearly projects a very non-confrontational stance, one which many commentators consider to be predicated on geography and/or development. McMahon and Ascherio, 117 Freedman 118 and Abebe 119 are amongst the commentators noting a north-south divide, or to be more precise, West-ern European and Others Group augmented by EU members of the Eastern European bloc against the rest of the U.N. Western and Eastern European states are of course all subject to fairly robust human rights standards through the Council of Europe's Convention on Human Rights, overseen by the European Court of Human Rights. Other members of the Western Europe and Others Group have their own strong national systems: Canada, Australia and New Zealand, for example. A more adversarial type of approach is thus normal in these states and human rights standards prevalent in each state are regularly challenged in courts and tribunals. However, these are also relatively established, developed states, ranking amongst the highest levels of development in the world. They thus may view the periodic review process more as mechanism for fast-tracking states to higher levels of compliance with human rights than a means to discuss problems and challenges. For China, a much more literal approach is taken to ensuring the review process is cooperative, non-judgmental, etc. Whether this will result in positive changes remains to be seen. For sure, most African and Asian states take a similar approach to that evinced by China. Neumayer 120 is one commentator noting the general reluctance of states to criticise each others' human rights performance. In part this reticence can be traced to a fundamental tenet of public international law -non-interference in national sovereignty, 121 a doctrine China avidly supports. 
ConClUdIng CoMMentS
Without doubt China is notable in the working group reports as making very supportive and encouraging comments to some of the least developed states on earth, drawing attention to small gains and the presence of political will for change. This certainly permits China to claim credit in its promotion of human rights around the world. 123 However, the lack of criticism and constructive comments requiring positive action belies passivity on the part of China. Arguably, it is all show -overt indication of a willingness to participate occluding a lack of engagement with proactive change agents within states. China's involvement in the process is perhaps inevitable, given how hard it lobbied for a softly approach. It would be hypocritical of it to then absolve itself of participation. Although China can, on the basis of statistics, claim to be an active participant, it is clear that China's involvement is more passive than active. China's involvement is a classic case of "much ado about nothing" -justifying a fanfare and claims of "credit" on the international stage, without any underpinning substance. It can be averred that China's successful negotiation, on behalf of the Like Minded Group, of a more "watered-down" version of universal periodic review than perhaps would otherwise have been the case, marked China's card. It was not open to China to do anything other than go along with the new mechanism; after all, it had in effect got what it wanted and thus was under a moral obligation to demonstrate willingness. For China, this is a "win, win" situation as China's participation is unequivocal evidence of its participation in the U.N. human rights system. That China has fully engaged with the process is beyond question even although there are criticisms that China's participation has skewed the process away from a critical analysis of state performance.
At the inaugural session of the Human Rights Council, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China concluded his remarks with the following words of an ancient Chinese poem: "[t]he new will invariably supersede the old, and change is expected of every generation." 124 The veracity of that statement with respect to international human rights monitoring in incontestable. Whether H.E. Mr Yang's aspiration that "the Human Rights Council will go farther along the right track and make greater contribution to improving human well-being" 125 is less obvious. China has undoubtedly been an active and vocal participant in universal periodic review thus it would appear the Chinese government considers universal periodic review to be the "right track" for monitoring human rights. What is difficult is determining the extent to which China's positive, supportive interventions actually contribute to "improving human well being," and, of course, the "human rights situation on the ground." China has good form with active participation in universal periodic review, the substantial benefits however remain to be seen.
PoStSCRIPt
Since this article was finalised, China has been re-elected to the Human Rights Council for a full three year term (2014-2016) and has completed its second cycle universal periodic review (October 2013, working group interactive dialogue; February 2014, China's views on recommendations communicated).
